| Description |
Auctions are a widespread and essential tool for selling to a group of agents. Auctions are used to sell
items, varying from rights on broadband network frequencies, to timber, to collectible items and works of
art. Auctions have received significant attention in the academic economic literature, both theoretical and
empirical. Auction theory is a great course to apply some already acquired fundamental game-theoretic
concepts and to learn some new ones. The aim of this course is to introduce the students to the main
auction formats, learn how to model the behavior of bidders in those auctions, and how to solve for the
equilibrium behavior. The course is going to start with modeling first- and second-price auctions in the
complete information environment, and then continue with the incomplete information environment. We
are going to establish the revenue equivalence result, and also derive the optimal mechanism for selling
in the independent values case. Next, we will proceed with special environments: interdependent values;
affiliated signals; multiple objects. We will also study the related contests class of games, and specifically,
all-pay auctions, which are widely used to model competitive environments. If time allows, we will study
the empirical research of auctions.
Reading List
- Vijay Krishna. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009
- Paul Robert Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press, 2004
- Paul Klemperer. Auctions: theory and practice. Princeton University Press, 2004
Lecture: Tuesday, 08.15-10.00h, S201, UniS
1. Exam: Tuesday, 21.12.2021, 08.15-10.00h, S201, UniS
2. Exam: Tuesday, 15.02.2022, 08.15-10.00h *** online *** details will be found in ILIAS |
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